科技與生活的英語(yǔ)文章

　　許多鄉(xiāng)村延聘農(nóng)業(yè)科技人員，把這當(dāng)作招財(cái)進(jìn)寶的好辦法，為了攻克技術(shù)難關(guān)，科技人員廢寢忘食，日夜奮戰(zhàn)。下面小編整理了關(guān)于科技與生活的英語(yǔ)文章，希望大家喜歡!

　　關(guān)于科技與生活的英語(yǔ)文章品析

　　索尼擬進(jìn)軍手機(jī)游戲領(lǐng)域

　　Sony is set to push aggressively into mobile gaming, having watched from the sidelines as itsconsole rival Nintendo enjoyed meteoric success with the Pokémon Go augmented reality(AR) game.

　　在目睹游戲機(jī)方面的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手任天堂(Nintendo)享受《口袋妖怪GO》(Pokémon GO，又譯精靈寶可夢(mèng)GO)這款增強(qiáng)現(xiàn)實(shí)(AR)游戲帶來(lái)的驚人成功后，索尼(Sony)計(jì)劃積極推進(jìn)手機(jī)游戲。

　　[Mobile gaming] is something we are aggressively getting into, Sony chief executive Kaz Hiraitold the Financial Times at the IFA consumer electronics show in Berlin. It’s quite a shift frombeing just a console-based business to being on mobile phones as well, he said.

　　(手機(jī)游戲)是我們積極進(jìn)軍的領(lǐng)域，索尼首席執(zhí)行官平井一夫(Kazuo Hirai)在柏林國(guó)際電子消費(fèi)品展覽會(huì)(IFA)上向英國(guó)《金融時(shí)報(bào)》表示，從只關(guān)注游戲機(jī)業(yè)務(wù)到同樣參與手機(jī)游戲業(yè)務(wù)，是一次重大轉(zhuǎn)變。

　　Pokémon Go is a real game-changer.

　　《口袋妖怪GO》真正改變了行業(yè)局勢(shì)。

　　I’m very interested in the fact that it has the potential to really change the way people move,literally.

　　我對(duì)于它有可能改變?nèi)藗兊囊苿?dòng)方式的情況非常感興趣。

　　AR, the feature that allows Pokémon Go to superimpose animated characters on to asmartphone screen showing the real world, is a great innovative idea that’s going to lift allboats for the video game industry, the Japanese boss said, adding that he would like to add ARcapabilities to his company’s stable of games.

　　平井一夫表示，AR是使得視頻游戲行業(yè)的所有人受益的偉大創(chuàng)意 。他補(bǔ)充稱，他希望在索尼的游戲中加入AR功能。該技術(shù)使得《口袋妖怪GO》在顯示現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的手機(jī)屏幕上疊加動(dòng)畫(huà)角色。

　　Despite Nintendo’s surprise hit, the two Japanese console competitors have been slow to jointhe smartphone gaming party to date.

　　盡管任天堂造成了意想不到的轟動(dòng)，但這兩家日本游戲機(jī)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手迄今在加入智能手機(jī)游戲市場(chǎng)方面動(dòng)作緩慢。

　　Sony and Nintendo own their platforms and want to retain control and make as much moneyas possible from them, says Steve Bailey, gaming analyst at IHS Markit.

　　索尼和任天堂都擁有自己的平臺(tái)，他們想維持控制地位，從平臺(tái)上賺到盡可能多的錢。

　　But the landscape has now changed considerably.

　　IHS Markit的游戲行業(yè)分析師史蒂夫•貝利(Steve Bailey)說(shuō)，但如今，市場(chǎng)狀況已發(fā)生了很大變化。

　　The threat from mobile is so big, they can no longer ignore it.

　　來(lái)自手機(jī)游戲的威脅太大，他們?cè)僖矡o(wú)法對(duì)此視而不見(jiàn)。

　　Nintendo launched its first-ever mobile app, Miitomo, in March this year, while Sony has had achequered history in the market.

　　今年3月，任天堂推出了公司歷史上第一款移動(dòng)應(yīng)用Miitomo，而索尼在這一市場(chǎng)一直不很成功。

　　There have been several failed initiatives to port PlayStation games to handheld consoles and itsXperia smartphones.

　　索尼曾多次嘗試把PlayStation游戲移植到掌上游戲機(jī)和它的Xperia智能手機(jī)上，但都以失敗告終。

　　經(jīng)典關(guān)于科技與生活的英語(yǔ)文章

　　蘋(píng)果遇到喬布斯式對(duì)手

　　Here’s to the crazy ones. The misfits. The rebels. The troublemakers. The round pegs in the square holes. The ones who see things differently. They’re not fond of rules.

　　1997年蘋(píng)果(Apple)在其《非同凡“想”》(Think Different)電視廣告中贊頌道：“向瘋狂的人們致敬。向格格不入的人們、向離經(jīng)叛道的人們、向惹是生非的人們、向方孔中的圓形螺絲、向以不同視角看問(wèn)題的人們致敬。

　　And they have no respect for the status quo,” ran the eulogy of Apple’s Think Different television advertisement in 1997. In the same spirit, here’s to Margrethe Vestager.

　　他們不喜歡墨守成規(guī)，他們也不愿安于現(xiàn)狀。”以同樣的精神，我要向瑪格麗特•維斯特格(Margrethe Vestager)致敬。

　　The EU competition commissioner insists she is not deliberately making trouble by deciding this week that Ireland should levy Euro13bn in taxes that it allowed the company to underpay over a decade.

　　這位歐盟反壟斷專員本周認(rèn)定，愛(ài)爾蘭應(yīng)該向蘋(píng)果征收130億歐元的稅款，這是十多年來(lái)愛(ài)爾蘭讓蘋(píng)果少交的稅。維斯特格堅(jiān)稱，她這一決定不是在故意找麻煩。

　　“No rules have been changed — not one,” she retorted to the accusation that she is ripping up international tax treaties and diverting US tax revenues to Europe. She looked unperturbed by the rumpus.

　　對(duì)于有關(guān)她在撕毀國(guó)際稅務(wù)協(xié)議并將屬于美國(guó)的稅收引至歐洲的指控，她反駁稱：“沒(méi)有任何規(guī)則被更改了——一條也沒(méi)有。”看起來(lái)此事引起的爭(zhēng)議并未讓她不安。

　　Ms Vestager seems to have taken lessons from Apple about presentation. Her original 2014 complaint against the company was jammed with details. This week’s update was pared down and clean, making the argument simply.

　　維斯特格似乎已從蘋(píng)果那里學(xué)習(xí)了關(guān)于表達(dá)方式的技巧。她2014年對(duì)蘋(píng)果最初的投訴滿紙細(xì)節(jié)。而本周的更新版本則篇幅大減，非常簡(jiǎn)潔，簡(jiǎn)單地陳述了論點(diǎn)。

　　Steve Jobs might have appreciated the elegant Danish design, although the content infuriated the US and Irish governments — and Tim Cook, Jobs’s successor as Apple chief executive.

　　史蒂夫•喬布斯(Steve Jobs)沒(méi)準(zhǔn)會(huì)欣賞這種優(yōu)雅的丹麥表達(dá)，盡管她所說(shuō)的內(nèi)容激怒了美國(guó)和愛(ài)爾蘭政府——以及接替喬布斯擔(dān)任蘋(píng)果首席執(zhí)行官的蒂姆•庫(kù)克(Tim Cook)。

　　Its simplicity is both a weakness and a strength. The weakness is that it is hard to believe it will hold up in court, where the argument is heading.

　　這種簡(jiǎn)潔既是弱點(diǎn)，也是優(yōu)勢(shì)。其薄弱之處在于，很難相信它在將要走向的法庭上能夠站得住腳。

　　There is something a bit too neat about the way Ms Vestager sliced through the Gordian knot of transfer pricing and tax residency with one stroke by declaring Apple’s three-decade-old arrangements with Ireland invalid.

　　維斯特格宣稱蘋(píng)果與愛(ài)爾蘭之間長(zhǎng)達(dá)三十年的制度安排無(wú)效，一舉突破了轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)和納稅居地這個(gè)復(fù)雜的戈?duì)柕现Y(jié)，不過(guò)這種快刀斬亂麻的方式有些太過(guò)簡(jiǎn)單化了。

　　Corporate tax is a complex matter: intellectual property can be moved to offshore locations and exploited at arm’s length according to intricate related-party formulas; sales in one country can become revenues in another; US companies can invert themselves to somewhere else.

　　公司稅是個(gè)復(fù)雜的問(wèn)題：知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)可以轉(zhuǎn)移至國(guó)外，并依照復(fù)雜的關(guān)聯(lián)方安排，方便地取用;在一國(guó)的銷售可能會(huì)變成在另一國(guó)的營(yíng)收;美國(guó)企業(yè)可能會(huì)將自身“倒置”到其他地方去。

　　If any tax arrangement that beats others can be outlawed as selective state aid, a lot of tax lawyers are out of work.

　　如果任何優(yōu)越的稅務(wù)安排都可被認(rèn)定為選擇性政府補(bǔ)助、因而非法，許多稅務(wù)律師就失業(yè)了。

　　Ms Vestager’s strength is that none of that makes much sense, or feels justifiable, to individual taxpayers.

　　維斯特格的優(yōu)勢(shì)則在于，在單個(gè)的納稅人看來(lái)，上述這些都不怎么合理，感覺(jué)上也不怎么正當(dāng)。

　　“If my effective tax rate would be 0.05 per cent, falling to 0.005, I would have felt that maybe I should have a second look at my tax bill,” she said. Apple insists that it paid 0m in taxes in Ireland in 2014, but her rhetoric was powerful.

　　維斯特格說(shuō)：“如果我的有效稅率原本是0.05%，它降到0.005%時(shí)，我會(huì)感覺(jué)自己是不是看錯(cuò)了稅單。”蘋(píng)果堅(jiān)稱2014年它在愛(ài)爾蘭支付了4億美元稅款，然而維斯特格的說(shuō)法十分有力。

　　Apple sounded quite flustered as it protested that things are not as they appear. On tax matters, it resembles the nerdy PC character in its “Get a Mac” campaign in the 2000s, with Ms Vestager as the cool, cocksure Mac.

　　蘋(píng)果抗議稱事實(shí)并不像表面看上去的那樣，這話顯得它很心慌。在稅務(wù)問(wèn)題上，蘋(píng)果就像2000年代的《買臺(tái)Mac》(Get a Mac)系列廣告中代表個(gè)人電腦(PC)的那個(gè)呆頭呆腦的角色，而維斯特格則像代表Mac的那個(gè)酷酷的、自信滿滿的角色。

　　The more it explains that it has deferred taxation, not avoided it, the more conventionally corporate it looks.

　　蘋(píng)果越是解釋它是推遲、而非逃避了納稅，它看起來(lái)就越像一家傳統(tǒng)企業(yè)。

　　Its tax challenge is straightforward enough, and is common to a lot of US companies. It produces most of its value — its intellectual property and distinct approach to technology and design — in California.

　　它面臨的稅務(wù)挑戰(zhàn)非常簡(jiǎn)單，對(duì)許多美國(guó)企業(yè)也十分常見(jiàn)。蘋(píng)果的多數(shù)價(jià)值(它的知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)以及它在技術(shù)和設(shè)計(jì)上的獨(dú)特思路)都是在加利福尼亞州創(chuàng)造的。

　　Under existing global tax treaties, it could legitimately channel most profits from around the world back to the US through royalty fees on overseas sales.

　　按照現(xiàn)有的全球稅收協(xié)議，它可以通過(guò)對(duì)境外銷售收取的許可費(fèi)，合法地將其在世界各地獲得的大部分利潤(rùn)轉(zhuǎn)移回美國(guó)。

　　It does not want to do this because that would involve paying up to 35 per cent tax in the US on the profits compared with Ireland’s 12.5 per cent rate.

　　然而，蘋(píng)果不想這么做，原因是這么做意味著這些利潤(rùn)要在美國(guó)繳納最高達(dá)35%的稅款，相比之下在愛(ài)爾蘭只需繳納12.5%。

　　The simple answer, as Ms Vestager points out, would be to pay the latter instead; Apple is structured so it could easily do so. Its Irish subsidiaries hold royalty rights for European sales and most profits flow there.

　　正如維斯特格所指出的，按照后一種稅率繳稅是很容易得出的答案。蘋(píng)果的結(jié)構(gòu)讓它可以輕而易舉地這么做。它在愛(ài)爾蘭的分公司持有歐洲銷售的許可權(quán)，這樣多數(shù)利潤(rùn)就流向了那里。

　　But Ireland used to offer a twist: the right to form companies that were not tax resident there or in the US. Rather than pay taxes immediately, Apple could defer them under US tax law.

　　不過(guò)，愛(ài)爾蘭也曾經(jīng)提供了可乘之機(jī)，讓既非愛(ài)爾蘭納稅居民也非美國(guó)納稅居民的公司得以成立。按照美國(guó)稅法，蘋(píng)果可以不用馬上繳納稅款，而是過(guò)后繳納。

　　Hence its anger about being accused of tax dodging: where others see billions in unpaid Irish taxes, Apple and the US government see future US ones. Apple is not, overall, an aggressive tax avoider: it paid .1bn in taxes last year.

　　這正是蘋(píng)果被譴責(zé)避稅后憤怒的原因：在其他人眼中數(shù)十億未繳納的愛(ài)爾蘭稅款，在蘋(píng)果和美國(guó)政府看來(lái)卻是未來(lái)將交給美國(guó)的稅款?？傮w上說(shuō)，蘋(píng)果并不是激進(jìn)的避稅者：去年該公司繳納了191億美元的稅款。

　　It is not quite so simple, though. Apple has made provisions for deferred US taxes on about half of the 5bn in cash and equivalents it held overseas in 2015.

　　不過(guò)，事情并沒(méi)有這么簡(jiǎn)單。蘋(píng)果已為其將延遲向美國(guó)繳納的稅款做了撥備，這些稅款對(duì)應(yīng)的是該公司2015年在海外持有的2150億美元現(xiàn)金及現(xiàn)金等同物的約一半。

　　It is waiting for the US tax rate to fall before it repatriates this money to shareholders, but this could be a long time. It may never send back the rest: US companies often reinvest overseas cash in growth or acquisitions.

　　蘋(píng)果打算等美國(guó)調(diào)低稅率后，再把這筆資金轉(zhuǎn)回到股東手上。然而時(shí)間可能會(huì)很長(zhǎng)。剩余部分蘋(píng)果可能永遠(yuǎn)都不會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)回來(lái)：美國(guó)企業(yè)經(jīng)常會(huì)把在境外的現(xiàn)金再次投資，用于企業(yè)增長(zhǎng)或收購(gòu)。

　　US corporate taxation is especially peculiar and hard to grasp and is painfully dysfunctional. The US government keeps on trying to pass tax reforms, and the details of Apple’s Irish tax structures first emerged publicly during a Senate committee investigation three years ago.

　　美國(guó)的公司稅制特別古怪和令人費(fèi)解，毛病很大。美國(guó)政府一直試圖通過(guò)稅務(wù)改革法案。蘋(píng)果在愛(ài)爾蘭的稅務(wù)結(jié)構(gòu)的具體情況，是三年前在一項(xiàng)參議院委員會(huì)的調(diào)查中首次公開(kāi)的。

　　The Senate identified US companies’ overseas cash as a tax target for the US not the EU.

　　美國(guó)參議院當(dāng)時(shí)確認(rèn)，美國(guó)企業(yè)在美國(guó)境外的現(xiàn)金，由美國(guó)而不是歐盟(EU)征稅。

　　Enter Ms Vestager, with her plan to make Ireland retrieve Euro13bn, and to let other EU countries stake their own claims to the money.

　　維斯特格登場(chǎng)了。她的計(jì)劃是讓愛(ài)爾蘭收回130億歐元稅款，讓其他歐盟國(guó)家聲索對(duì)這筆錢的所有權(quán)。

　　Since no one else moved, she gained first mover advantage, and state aid law has given her extraordinary legal powers. It is an audacious, revolutionary and surprising move, but that was Jobs’s style too.

　　由于其他人沒(méi)有行動(dòng)，她取得了先發(fā)制人的優(yōu)勢(shì)，而國(guó)家援助法賦予了她驚人的法律力量。這是個(gè)大膽、革命性又令人驚異的舉動(dòng)，不過(guò)這也是喬布斯的風(fēng)格。

　　Her boldness will change the rules of global taxation if it survives the legal challenges. Bill Gates, Microsoft co-founder, used to get irritated that Apple was hipper than his own company but arguing with public opinion got him nowhere. In Ms Vestager, Apple faces a cool opponent.

　　如果能經(jīng)受住相關(guān)法律挑戰(zhàn)的考驗(yàn)，維斯特格的大膽舉動(dòng)將改變?nèi)蚨愂盏囊?guī)則。微軟(Microsoft)聯(lián)合創(chuàng)始人比爾•蓋茨(Bill Gates)曾經(jīng)為蘋(píng)果比微軟酷而憤慨，然而他爭(zhēng)不過(guò)輿論。在維斯特格這里，蘋(píng)果遇到了一個(gè)酷對(duì)手。

　　關(guān)于科技與生活的英語(yǔ)文章

　　無(wú)人駕駛革命的主要阻力是人

　　Brilliant technologies transform the magical into the banal.

　　卓越的科技會(huì)把神奇的東西變得平淡無(wú)奇。

　　An idea that seems outlandish to one generation becomes commonplace to the next.

　　曾經(jīng)在一代人看來(lái)稀奇古怪的想法對(duì)于下一代人卻變得稀松平常。

　　So it has been with electricity, space flight and the internet.

　　電力、太空航行以及互聯(lián)網(wǎng)都是如此。

　　So it is likely to prove with driverless cars.

　　因此無(wú)人駕駛汽車可能也會(huì)如此。

　　The past few weeks have seen a flurry of announcements.

　　近幾周這個(gè)領(lǐng)域接連傳出許多消息。

　　Singapore has launched the world’s first public trial of a robo-taxi service.

　　新加坡展開(kāi)了全球首項(xiàng)無(wú)人駕駛出租車的公開(kāi)測(cè)試。

　　Uber and Volvo announced that they would pioneer an autonomous taxi fleet in Pittsburghwithin weeks.

　　優(yōu)步(Uber)和沃爾沃(Volvo)宣布，未來(lái)幾周內(nèi)，它們將率先在匹茲堡推出一支自動(dòng)駕駛出租車車隊(duì)。

　　Ford said it would build its first mass-market driverless car by 2021.

　　福特(Ford)表示，將在2021年前制造其首款面向大眾市場(chǎng)的無(wú)人駕駛汽車。

　　To their backers, autonomous cars cannot arrive quickly enough.

　　對(duì)于支持者而言，自動(dòng)駕駛汽車越快上路越好。

　　Conventional cars are inefficient, dangerous and dirty.

　　傳統(tǒng)汽車低效、危險(xiǎn)且骯臟。

　　They sit idle for 95 per cent of their lives, clogging up city streets and car parks.

　　它們有95%的時(shí)間在閑置，堵塞著城市街道和停車場(chǎng)。

　　When moving, they smash into each other, killing 3,500 people every day around the world.

　　在行駛中，它們會(huì)互相碰撞，全球每天有3500人死于交通事故。

　　Ninety per cent of accidents are caused by human error.

　　其中90%的事故是人為失誤造成的。

　　Cars pollute the environment, accounting for 45 per cent of oil burnt.

　　汽車污染環(huán)境，占石油消耗總量的45%。

　　The widespread adoption of fully autonomous and, still better, electric cars could therefore bea massive boon to mankind.

　　因此完全自動(dòng)化且質(zhì)量更好的電動(dòng)汽車得到廣泛應(yīng)用可能是人類的一大幸事。

　　It could lead to a far more efficient use of resources, save many lives and reduce congestionand pollution.

　　這可能會(huì)帶來(lái)資源的更有效利用、挽救很多生命并減少擁堵和污染。

　　Futurologists envisage small fleets of shareable, connected cars constantly whizzing aroundour cities picking up passengers on demand.

　　按照未來(lái)學(xué)家的構(gòu)想，一些由可分享的聯(lián)網(wǎng)汽車組成的小型車隊(duì)將時(shí)刻不停地繞著我們的城市飛馳，按照需求搭載乘客。

　　McKinsey forecasts that 15 per cent of new cars could be fully autonomous by 2030.

　　麥肯錫(McKinsey)預(yù)測(cè)，到2030年，15%的新車可能實(shí)現(xiàn)完全自動(dòng)駕駛。

　　But two obstacles block their widespread adoption.

　　但有兩個(gè)障礙因素阻礙著自動(dòng)駕駛汽車的普及。

　　The first remains technological.

　　第一個(gè)仍然是技術(shù)上的。

　　For all the astonishing advances made in recent years, it is phenomenally difficult to replicatehumans as sensory beings.

　　盡管最近幾年這方面技術(shù)取得了驚人的進(jìn)步，但要模仿人類打造具有感覺(jué)能力的自動(dòng)駕駛系統(tǒng)是極其困難的。

　　How does a car distinguish between a plastic bag blowing across a road and a runaway dog?How does a car nudge its way through a throng of people outside a football stadium?

　　汽車如何區(qū)分一個(gè)被風(fēng)吹過(guò)馬路的塑料袋和一條奔跑的狗?汽車如何穿過(guò)足球場(chǎng)外擁擠的人群?

　　Engineers argue that the genius of self-driving cars is their connectedness.

　　工程師辯稱，自動(dòng)駕駛汽車的優(yōu)勢(shì)在于聯(lián)網(wǎng)。

　　When human drivers make a mistake the individual learns from it, says one Silicon Valleypioneer. When a self-driving car makes a mistake then every other car will learn from a mistakeonce an engineer has fixed it.

　　當(dāng)人類駕駛員犯錯(cuò)時(shí)，這個(gè)人會(huì)從中吸取教訓(xùn)，一位硅谷先驅(qū)表示，當(dāng)一輛自動(dòng)駕駛汽車犯錯(cuò)時(shí)，一旦工程師修復(fù)了這個(gè)問(wèn)題，其他所有汽車都會(huì)相應(yīng)改進(jìn)。

　　It is just a matter of time before our technology surpasses human capacity.

　　科技超越人類能力只是早晚的事。

　　But sceptics compare autonomous car technology with Zeno’s dichotomy paradox: every leapwill take us halfway to our destination without ever reaching it.

　　但懷疑者將自動(dòng)駕駛技術(shù)比作芝諾(Zeno)的二分法悖論：每一步跳躍都是向著目的地走出剩余路程的二分之一，但永遠(yuǎn)不可能到達(dá)終點(diǎn)。

　　No matter how hard the technology proves, it may be the easier part of the puzzle.

　　不管事實(shí)證明要攻克技術(shù)有多難，它也可能是這個(gè)難題中較為容易的部分。

　　A stiffer challenge remains the human.

　　更為嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn)仍然是人類。

　　Even when manufacturers and software engineers develop fully autonomous cars in which theyhave total trust, it will still take many years, if not decades, for them to be freely embraced bygovernments and consumers.

　　即便制造商和軟件工程師開(kāi)發(fā)出他們自己完全信任的全自動(dòng)駕駛汽車，也需要花費(fèi)多年、甚至幾十年時(shí)間才能得到政府和消費(fèi)者的安心接納。

　　First, there is the instinctive human resistance to handing over control to a robot, especiallygiven fears of cyber-hacking.

　　首先，人類天生反對(duì)將控制權(quán)交給機(jī)器人，特別是在擔(dān)心黑客攻擊的情況下。

　　Second, for many drivers cars are an extension of their identity, a mechanical symbol ofindependence, control and freedom.

　　其次，對(duì)于多數(shù)駕駛員而言，汽車是他們身份的延伸，是獨(dú)立、控制和自由的機(jī)械象征。

　　They will not abandon them lightly.

　　他們不會(huì)輕易拋棄汽車。

　　Third, robots will always be held to far higher safety standards than humans.

　　第三，針對(duì)機(jī)器人總是要實(shí)施比人類高得多的安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

　　They will inevitably cause accidents.

　　它們將不可避免的導(dǎo)致意外。

　　They will also have to be programmed to make a calculation that could kill their passengers orbystanders to minimise overall loss of life.

　　它們還必須經(jīng)過(guò)編程做出可能導(dǎo)致乘客或行人死亡的計(jì)算，以將總體人員損失降至最低。

　　This will create a fascinating philosophical sub-school of algorithmic morality.

　　這將引發(fā)一個(gè)有趣的關(guān)于算法道德的哲學(xué)問(wèn)題。

　　Many of us are afraid that one reckless act will cause an accident that causes a backlash andshuts down the industry for a decade, says the Silicon Valley engineer. That would be tragic ifyou could have saved tens of thousands of lives a year.

　　我們很多人擔(dān)心一個(gè)冒失的行為將導(dǎo)致一場(chǎng)事故，進(jìn)而這個(gè)行業(yè)會(huì)遭到抗議并被封殺10年，那位硅谷工程師表示，如果你原本可以每年挽救數(shù)萬(wàn)人的生命，那么這種結(jié)果將是一場(chǎng)悲劇。

　　Fourth, the deployment of autonomous vehicles could destroy millions of jobs.

　　第四，自動(dòng)駕駛汽車的使用可能會(huì)葬送數(shù)百萬(wàn)個(gè)就業(yè)崗位。

　　Their rapid introduction is certain to provoke resistance.

　　這些汽車的快速引入肯定會(huì)遭遇抵制。

　　There are 3.5m professional lorry drivers in the US.

　　美國(guó)有350萬(wàn)名職業(yè)貨車司機(jī)。

　　Fifth, the insurance industry and legal community have to wrap their heads around sometricky liability issues.

　　第五，保險(xiǎn)行業(yè)和司法界必須埋頭解決一些復(fù)雜的責(zé)任問(wèn)題。

　　In what circumstances is the owner, car manufacturer or software developer responsible fordamage?

　　在何種情況下，汽車所有者、汽車制造商或軟件開(kāi)發(fā)商要對(duì)損害負(fù)責(zé)?

　　Some governments, such as those of Singapore, China and the UK, as well as several states inthe US are creating permissive regulatory and legal environments.

　　新加坡、中國(guó)和英國(guó)等一些國(guó)家的政府以及美國(guó)幾個(gè)州正在創(chuàng)造寬松的監(jiān)管和法律環(huán)境。

　　Regulators can certainly speed adoption by approving designated lanes for autonomous cars,for example, and devising international safety rules and standards.

　　監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)無(wú)疑可以加速推動(dòng)自動(dòng)駕駛汽車的使用，比如說(shuō)通過(guò)批準(zhǔn)建設(shè)自動(dòng)駕駛汽車專用道，以及制定國(guó)際安全規(guī)則與標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。

　　Conversely, politicians may yet succumb to the pressure of public fears and vested interestsand frustrate the roll out of self-driving cars.

　　相反，政治人士仍可能屈服于公眾擔(dān)憂以及既得利益群體的壓力，阻礙自動(dòng)駕駛汽車的應(yīng)用。

　　Autonomous car visionaries may soon be able to perfect the technology.

　　自動(dòng)駕駛汽車的夢(mèng)想家們可能很快就能完善技術(shù)。

　　But their success may be determined by how good they are — in Stalinist terminology — asengineers of human souls.

　　但他們能否成功可能取決于他們作為人類靈魂的工程師(用斯大林主義者的術(shù)語(yǔ)來(lái)說(shuō))有多優(yōu)秀。