Bill Gross,他是“安靜的巨鯊”。在20年內(nèi)，他把一個(gè)小創(chuàng)業(yè)公司打造成由100多個(gè)公司組成的商業(yè)帝國。這位商業(yè)巨佬親自傳授他的創(chuàng)業(yè)方法。下面是小編為大家收集關(guān)于TED英語演講：創(chuàng)業(yè)公司如何才能成功，歡迎借鑒參考。

　　創(chuàng)業(yè)公司如何才能成功

　　演講者：Bill Gross

　　I'm really excited to share with you some findings that really surprise me about what makes companies succeed the most, what factors actually matter the most for startup success.I believe that the startup organization is one of the greatest forms to make the world a better place.

　　非常高興，能夠與你們分享 一些使我感到十分驚訝的發(fā)現(xiàn)。 這些發(fā)現(xiàn)是關(guān)于什么最能使公司成功以及對(duì)于創(chuàng)業(yè)公司，什么因素最要緊。 我相信，創(chuàng)業(yè)組織是使世界成為更好的地方的最偉大的形式之一。

　　If you take a group of people with the right equity incentives and organize them in a startup, you can unlock human potential in a way never before possible. You get them to achieve unbelievable things.But if the startup organization is so great, why do so many fail? That's what I wanted to find out.

　　如果你能用合適的股權(quán)激勵(lì)來召集一幫人 并且把他們組織起來創(chuàng)業(yè)的話 你就能以前所未有的方式釋放了人類潛能。 并引領(lǐng)他們?nèi)ネ瓿刹豢芍眯诺氖虑椤?但是，如果創(chuàng)業(yè)組織那么偉大，為什么還會(huì)有很多失敗呢? 這就是我想要探究的問題。

　　I wanted to find out what actually matters most for startup success.And I wanted to try to be systematic about it, avoid some of my instincts and maybe misperceptions I have from so many companies I've seen over the years.I wanted to know this because I've been starting businesses since I was 12 years old when I sold candy at the bus stop in junior high school。

　　我想要了解，對(duì)創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的成功來說， 到底什么最為重要。 我也想要對(duì)此問題系統(tǒng)化的分析，避免一些因?yàn)槲疫@些年看到許多公司 而得來的直覺上的誤解。 我想要知道這個(gè)，因?yàn)?，我?2歲上初中，在汽車站售賣糖果時(shí)， 便開始我自己的商業(yè)活動(dòng)。

　　to high school, when I made solar energy devices, to college, when I made loudspeakers. And when I graduated from college, I started software companies. And 20 years ago, I started Idealab, and in the last 20 years, we started more than 100 companies, many successes, and many big failures. We learned a lot from those failures.So I tried to look across what factors accounted the most for company success and failure.

　　在高中時(shí)，我做太陽能設(shè)備的生意， 在大學(xué)時(shí)，我做擴(kuò)音器生意。 當(dāng)我從大學(xué)畢業(yè)的時(shí)候，我成立了一家軟件公司。 20年前，我成立了創(chuàng)意實(shí)驗(yàn)室， 在過去的20年里，我們成立超過100家公司。 其中，很多成功了，也有很多失敗了。 我們從那些失敗中學(xué)到了很多。 所以，我嘗試去探索是什么因素導(dǎo)致公司的成敗。

　　So I looked at these five. First, the idea. I used to think that the idea was everything. I named my company Idealab for how much I worship the "aha!" moment when you first come up with the idea. But then over time, I came to think that maybe the team, the execution, adaptability, that mattered even more than the idea.

　　所以我關(guān)注在這5點(diǎn)。 第一，創(chuàng)意。 我過去認(rèn)為，創(chuàng)意就是全部。 我將我的公司命名為創(chuàng)意實(shí)驗(yàn)室， 是因?yàn)?，我十分推崇，?dāng)你首次想到某個(gè)想法的時(shí)候，“aha”(啊哈)開竅的時(shí)刻。 但是，隨著時(shí)間的推移， 我認(rèn)為或許團(tuán)隊(duì)、執(zhí)行力或者是適應(yīng)力， 比創(chuàng)意更要緊。

　　I never thought I'd be quoting boxer Mike Tyson on the TED stage, but he once said, "Everybody has a plan, until they get punched in the face." (Laughter) And I think that's so true about business as well. So much about a team's execution is its ability to adapt to getting punched in the face by the customer. The customer is the true reality. And that's why I came to think that the team maybe was the most important thing.

　　我從沒想過，我會(huì)在TED的舞臺(tái)上，引用拳王泰森的話，但是，他曾經(jīng)說過， “每個(gè)人都有計(jì)劃，直到被人打臉為止。”(笑聲) 我認(rèn)為，對(duì)于生意也是這樣的。 對(duì)于一個(gè)團(tuán)隊(duì)的執(zhí)行力為說，最要緊的， 是它使自己能適應(yīng)被客戶打臉的能力。 客戶就是真理。 這就是為什么我認(rèn)為 團(tuán)隊(duì)是最重要的事情。

　　Then I started looking at the business model. Does the company have a very clear path generating customer revenues? That started rising to the top in my thinking about maybe what mattered most for success.Then I looked at the funding. Sometimes companies received intense amounts of funding. Maybe that's the most important thing?

　　然后，我開始關(guān)注商業(yè)模式，就是這個(gè)公司是否有一條清晰的能產(chǎn)生客戶收益的路線圖嗎? 商業(yè)模式開始成為我對(duì)什么對(duì)成功最重要 這一思考的重點(diǎn)。 然后，我關(guān)注了資金。有時(shí)候一些公司會(huì)去吸納大量的資金， 也許這是最重要的事情?

　　And then of course, the timing. Is the idea way too early and the world's not ready for it? Is it early, as in, you're in advance and you have to educate the world? Is it just right? Or is it too late, and there's already too many competitors? So I tried to look very carefully at these five factors across many companies. And I looked across all 100 Idealab companies, and 100 non-Idealab companies to try and come up with something scientific about it.

　　當(dāng)然還有時(shí)機(jī)，這個(gè)想法是不是太早了，我們還沒有做好迎接它的準(zhǔn)備? 它是不是太超前了以至于你不得不來教導(dǎo)世界? 它恰在時(shí)機(jī)嗎? 或者它是不是太晚，已經(jīng)有太多的公司競(jìng)爭(zhēng)? 所以我努力去認(rèn)真考察這五個(gè)因素在公司中的影響。 我考察了100家創(chuàng)意實(shí)驗(yàn)室下的公司， 還有100家非創(chuàng)意實(shí)驗(yàn)室下的公司， 試圖提出一些科學(xué)的東西。

　　So first, on these Idealab companies, the top five companies -- Citysearch, CarsDirect, GoTo, NetZero, Tickets.com -- those all became billion-dollar successes. And the five companies on the bottom -- Z.com, Insider Pages, MyLife, Desktop Factory, Peoplelink -- we all had high hopes for, but didn't succeed.So I tried to rank across all of those attributes how I felt those companies scored on each of those dimensions. And then for non-Idealab companies, I looked at wild successes, like Airbnb and Instagram and Uber and Youtube and LinkedIn.

　　首先，在這些創(chuàng)意實(shí)驗(yàn)公司里，排在前面的五家公司 Citysearch ,CarsDirct, GoTo, NetZero, Tickets.com 最后都成為了十億美元以上的成功公司 而下面的五家公司 Z.com, Insider Pages, MyLife,Desktop Factory, Peoplelink 我們?cè)囊灾赝?，但沒有成功。 所以我試圖就這些公司在每個(gè)因素中的得分，給它們排序。 然后對(duì)于非創(chuàng)意實(shí)驗(yàn)公司，我關(guān)注極度的成功者， 像Airbnb，Instagram, Uber ,YouTube ,Linkedln

　　And some failures: Webvan, Kozmo, Pets.com Flooz and Friendster. The bottom companies had intense funding, they even had business models in some cases, but they didn't succeed. I tried to look at what factors actually accounted the most for success and failure across all of these companies, and the results really surprised me.The number one thing was timing.

　　還有一些失敗的案例，Webvan,Kozmo,Pets.com Flooz 和 Friendster 墊底的公司都有雄厚的資金 一些案例甚至有商業(yè)模式在里面 但是，他們并沒有成功。 我嘗試考察在這些成功和失敗的案例中 到底什么因素真的最重要 結(jié)果讓我大吃一驚 最重要的是時(shí)機(jī)，

　　Timing accounted for 42 percent of the difference between success and failure. Team and execution came in second, and the idea, the differentiability of the idea, the uniqueness of the idea, that actually came in third.Now, this isn't absolutely definitive, it's not to say that the idea isn't important, but it very much surprised me that the idea wasn't the most important thing. Sometimes it mattered more when it was actually timed.The last two, business model and funding, made sense to me actually.

　　在解釋成功和失敗的差異中時(shí)機(jī)占42% 團(tuán)隊(duì)和執(zhí)行力排在次位 然后是創(chuàng)意 創(chuàng)意的差異，或者說創(chuàng)意的獨(dú)特性 實(shí)際上排在第三位 它不是決定性的不是說創(chuàng)意不重要 但創(chuàng)意不是最重要的，這還是讓我驚訝 有時(shí)候更重要的是它是否恰對(duì)時(shí)機(jī) 最末尾的兩項(xiàng)，商業(yè)模式和資金，實(shí)際上對(duì)我意義深遠(yuǎn)

　　I think business model makes sense to be that low because you can start out without a business model and add one later if your customers are demanding what you're creating. And funding, I think as well, if you're underfunded at first but you're gaining traction, especially in today's age, it's very, very easy to get intense funding.

　　我認(rèn)為商業(yè)模式 之所以不那么重要 是因?yàn)闆]有商業(yè)模式，你也可以創(chuàng)業(yè) 要是你的客戶正需要你的創(chuàng)新時(shí)，更是如此 至于資金，我認(rèn)為也一樣 如果你一開始資金不足然而卻可以不斷發(fā)展 實(shí)際上今天的時(shí)代 要想得到大量的資金真的非常非常的容易 那現(xiàn)在讓我針對(duì)每個(gè)方面舉一些具體的事例

　　So now let me give you some specific examples about each of these. So take a wild success like Airbnb that everybody knows about. Well, that company was famously passed on by many smart investors because people thought, "No one's going to rent out a space in their home to a stranger." Of course, people proved that wrong. But one of the reasons it succeeded, aside from a good business model, a good idea, great execution, is the timing.That company came out right during the height of the recession when people really needed extra money, and that maybe helped people overcome their objection to renting out their own home to a stranger.Same thing with Uber.

　　就以家耳熟能詳?shù)腁irbnb為例吧 這家公司一開始曾被很多投資者pass掉了 因?yàn)榇蠹矣X得 “沒人會(huì)騰出家里的一塊地方出租給陌生人” 當(dāng)然，后來證明大家是錯(cuò)的 但是它成功的一個(gè)原因 除了好的商業(yè)模式，好創(chuàng)意，強(qiáng)大的執(zhí)行力之外 就是時(shí)機(jī) 就在經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)的最高潮時(shí)，該公司出現(xiàn)了.這時(shí)人們真的很需要掙點(diǎn)外快 這或許幫助人們克服了要把自己的 房間出租給一個(gè)陌生人的障礙 對(duì)于Uber，情況相同

　　Uber came out, incredible company, incredible business model, great execution, too. But the timing was so perfect for their need to get drivers into the system. Drivers were looking for extra money; it was very, very important.Some of our early successes, Citysearch, came out when people needed web pages. GoTo.com, which we announced actually at TED in 1998, was when companies were looking for cost-effective ways to get traffic.

　　Uber的誕生 難以置信的公司，難以置信的商業(yè)模式 也有強(qiáng)大的執(zhí)行力 但當(dāng)它們需要拉司機(jī)進(jìn)入到這個(gè)體系時(shí) 時(shí)機(jī)恰好是那么完美 司機(jī)們正需要掙外快，這點(diǎn)至關(guān)重要 我們?cè)缙诘囊恍┏晒Ψ独?，像Citysearch城市搜索，就在大家需要網(wǎng)頁的時(shí)候誕生了GoTo.com，這個(gè)我們?cè)缭?998年就在Ted上說過 是在公司尋找劃算的獲得流量的方法時(shí)誕生的

　　We thought the idea was so great, but actually, the timing was probably maybe more important. And then some of our failures. We started a company called Z.com, it was an online entertainment company. We were so excited about it -- we raised enough money, we had a great business model, we even signed incredibly great Hollywood talent to join the company. But broadband penetration was too low in 1999-2000. It was too hard to watch video content online, you had to put codecs in your browser and do all this stuff, and the company eventually went out of business in 2003.

　　我們?cè)?jīng)認(rèn)為創(chuàng)意是那么重要 然而實(shí)際上，時(shí)機(jī)或許更重要些 然后是一些失敗的例子 我們?cè)鴦?chuàng)立過一個(gè)叫Z.com的線上娛樂公司 我們對(duì)此滿懷期待 我們籌集了大量的資金，我們有一個(gè)很棒的商業(yè)模式 甚至我們還將偉大的好萊塢天才們簽進(jìn)公司 但1999到2000年的寬帶普及程度實(shí)在太低 要想在網(wǎng)上看視頻太困難了 你不得不向?yàn)g覽器加入多媒體數(shù)字信號(hào)編解碼器，要加入所有編解碼器， 最后這家公司最終在2003年退出了市場(chǎng)

　　Just two years later, when the codec problem was solved by Adobe Flash and when broadband penetration crossed 50 percent in America, YouTube was perfectly timed. Great idea, but unbelievable timing. In fact, YouTube didn't even have a business model when it first started. It wasn't even certain that that would work out. But that was beautifully, beautifully timed.

　　僅僅在兩年之后,當(dāng)Adobe flash 解決了編解碼問題 并且全美的寬帶普及度達(dá)到50%后 YouTube正中時(shí)機(jī) 好的創(chuàng)意，不可思議的時(shí)機(jī) 事實(shí)上，YouTube 一開始都沒有一個(gè)商業(yè)模式 也不確定它是否會(huì)成功 但它是如此漂亮地正中時(shí)機(jī) 所以總結(jié)來說，我要說的就是執(zhí)行力真的很重要 創(chuàng)意很重要

　　So what I would say, in summary, is execution definitely matters a lot. The idea matters a lot. But timing might matter even more. And the best way to really assess timing is to really look at whether consumers are really ready for what you have to offer them. And to be really, really honest about it, not be in denial about any results that you see, because if you have something you love, you want to push it forward, but you have to be very, very honest about that factor on timing.

　　是，時(shí)機(jī)更重要 而真正要去評(píng)估時(shí)機(jī)的最佳方法 就是真的去考察消費(fèi)者是否真的做好準(zhǔn)備 為你所提供的服務(wù)做好準(zhǔn)備 對(duì)此，一定要實(shí)事求是 不要否認(rèn)你所看到的任何結(jié)果 因?yàn)槿绻阌邢矏鄣臇|西，你會(huì)想推動(dòng)它 但你不得不對(duì)時(shí)機(jī)這個(gè)因素非常非常的誠實(shí)

　　As I said earlier, I think startups can change the world and make the world a better place. I hope some of these insights can maybe help you have a slightly higher success ratio, and thus make something great come to the world that wouldn't have happened otherwise.Thank you very much, you've been a great audience.

　　正如我之前所說,我認(rèn)為創(chuàng)業(yè)公司可以改變世界，讓世界更加美好 我希望這些見解 可以幫助你們提高一點(diǎn)點(diǎn)成功的幾率 這樣就可以給世界帶來一點(diǎn) 本不會(huì)發(fā)生的好的改變 十分感謝，你已經(jīng)是一名偉大的聽眾。

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