金融英語相關(guān)詞匯匯總

　　不要以為金融行業(yè)離我們很遠(yuǎn)，其實(shí)它在我們生活的各個(gè)角落都有體現(xiàn)。學(xué)習(xí)一些金融英語詞匯對(duì)我們的生活以及工作也是有好處的，那些專業(yè)的金融詞匯一出來你就能大致了解意義，方便又安全。如果你是金融行業(yè)從業(yè)者，更要掌握這些金融的英語詞匯了。下面是小編為您收集整理的金融英語相關(guān)詞匯匯總，供大家參考!

　　金融英語相關(guān)詞匯匯總

　　51. diversification 分散投資

　　52. dividends 紅利

　　53. document of title 物權(quán)單據(jù)

　　54.double mortgage 雙重抵押

　　55. Documents against Acceptance,D/A 承兌交單

　　56. Documents against Payment,D/P 付款交單

　　57. domestic correspondent 國(guó)內(nèi)通匯銀行

　　58. domestic deposit 國(guó)內(nèi)存款

　　59. domestic exchange 國(guó)內(nèi)匯兌

　　60. double leasing 雙重租賃

　　61. documentary collection 跟單托收

　　62. double option 雙向期權(quán)

　　63. Dow Jones average 道·瓊斯平均數(shù)

　　64. down payment 首期

　　65. downgrade 降級(jí)

　　66. downside 下降趨勢(shì)

　　67. downtick 跌點(diǎn)交易

　　68. Dragon card 龍卡

　　69. draw 提款

　　70. draw cheque 簽發(fā)票據(jù)

　　71. drawee bank 付款銀行

　　72. drawing account 提款帳戶

　　73. dual exchange market 雙重外匯市場(chǎng)

　　74. dual trading 雙重交易

　　75. due from other funds 應(yīng)收其他基金款

　　76. electronic cash 電子現(xiàn)金

　　77. dumping 拋售

　　Implicit deflator 隱性通貨緊縮指數(shù)

　　Import quota 進(jìn)口配額

　　Import tariff 進(jìn)口關(guān)稅

　　In-the-money 價(jià)內(nèi)(期權(quán))

　　Incentive site 魚餌網(wǎng)點(diǎn)(互聯(lián)網(wǎng))

　　Income tax 所得稅;入息稅;薪俸稅

　　Indemnification 賠償

　　Indexed performance 指數(shù)表現(xiàn)

　　Indicative price 指示性價(jià)格

　　Industrail and Commercial Consolidated Tax 工商統(tǒng)一稅

　　Information memorandum 資料備忘錄

　　Information technology 信息科技

　　Initial Conversion Premium 初次轉(zhuǎn)換溢價(jià)

　　Initial Public Offering 首次公開招股發(fā)行

　　Insider trading 內(nèi)幕交易

　　Institutional investor 機(jī)構(gòu)投資者

　　Intangible asset 無形資產(chǎn)

　　Intellectual property (IP) 知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)

　　Interest Rate Swap 利率掉期

　　Intergovernmental loan 政府間貸款

　　Interim report 中期報(bào)告

　　Intermediary 中介機(jī)構(gòu); 中介人

　　International Accounting Standards 國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則

　　International Finance 國(guó)際融資

　　International Market 國(guó)際市場(chǎng)

　　International Monetary Fund 國(guó)際貨幣基金

　　International Monetary Market 國(guó)際貨幣市場(chǎng)

　　International Organization for Standardization 國(guó)際標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化組織

　　International Trust & Investment Corp. 國(guó)際信托投資公司(國(guó)投公司)

　　投資，大公司不一定就好

　　A Great Business Isn't a Great Investment at the Wrong Price or Wrong Terms

　　如果價(jià)格或者條件不合適，那大公司也不是好的投資之選

　　We spend a lot of time talking about the various traits of a good business - high returns on equity, little or no debt, franchise value, a shareholder friendly management, etc.

　　我們花了大量時(shí)間討論好的投資產(chǎn)品的多種特點(diǎn)：股本收益高、基本沒有債務(wù)、特許權(quán)價(jià)值、對(duì)股東有益的管理等等。

　　Although Charlie Munger's dictum, "it's far better to buy a good business at a fair price rather than a fair business a great price" is true, it is important for you to realize that good results are not likely to be had by those that buy such stocks regardless of price.

　　雖然查理·芒格說的“以相對(duì)公平的價(jià)格買下好的投資產(chǎn)品要好于以高昂價(jià)格買下一個(gè)相對(duì)公平的投資產(chǎn)品”是對(duì)的，但對(duì)你來說，懂得不考慮價(jià)格就買這樣的股票也不一定會(huì)有好的收益，這一點(diǎn)很重要。

　　It's a fine distinction, but one that can mean the difference between good results and disastrous losses. At least, not within a short period of time.

　　這是細(xì)微的差別，但它指的是高收益和災(zāi)難性損失之間的區(qū)別。至少短期內(nèi)是這樣的。

　　Back in the late 1960's, Wall Street became enthralled with a group of stocks dubbed The Nifty Fifty. Perhaps the online encyclopedia Wikipedia sums it up best, "[These stocks] had everything going for them - brand names, patents, top management, spectacular sales, and solid profits.

　　回顧20世紀(jì)60年代末期，華爾街迷上了一批稱為Nifty Fifty的股票，可能網(wǎng)絡(luò)百科全書Wikipedia總結(jié)得最到位“這些股票有所有讓你買下的理由：大牌、專利、高層管理人員、可觀的銷售額和穩(wěn)定的利潤(rùn)。

　　They were thought to be best stocks to buy them and hold them for the long run, and that was all you needed to do.

　　人們認(rèn)為這些是可以買下并長(zhǎng)期持有的最好的股票，你只需買下就好。

　　These were the stocks 'dreams' were made of ...for the long haul to retire with."

　　這些是做夢(mèng)都想買的股票，可以長(zhǎng)期持有，退休有它就夠了?！?/p>

　　The fatal flaw in this logic is that investors believed that these companies - enterprises such as Eastman Kodak and Xerox - were so inherently good that they could (and should) be bought at any price. Of course, this is simply not the case.

　　這一邏輯的致命缺陷就是投資者認(rèn)為這些公司如柯達(dá)公司和施樂太好了，以什么價(jià)格都能(而且應(yīng)該)買入，當(dāng)然事實(shí)并非如此。

　　Although a stock trading at a high p/e ratio isn't always overpriced, more often than not, a stock trading at a price-to-earnings ratio of 60x is almost assuredly going to generate a rate of return less than that of a so-called "risk-free" U.S. Treasury bond.

　　雖然以高市盈率交易的股票并非總是價(jià)格偏高，但往往以60x的市盈率交易的股票產(chǎn)生的回報(bào)率的確會(huì)低于所謂的“無風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”美國(guó)國(guó)債。

　　What makes this discussion complicated is:

　　導(dǎo)致這一問題復(fù)雜化的因素是：

　　First, many inexperienced investors fail to realize that, even though companies like Eastman Kodak went bankrupt, long-term investors still should have walked away with a lot more wealth than they had prior to their investment.

　　首先，很多缺乏經(jīng)驗(yàn)的投資者沒有意識(shí)到即使像柯達(dá)這樣的公司破產(chǎn)了，長(zhǎng)期投資者仍然可以帶著比投資之前賺到的更多的錢轉(zhuǎn)移資金。

　　This can be difficult to grasp if you aren't aware of how dividends, spin-offs, split-off, and even tax loss credits work but it is, nevertheless, the case.

　　如果你不懂股息、剝離、分拆，甚至抵稅是如何操作的，那這個(gè)很難掌握，但事實(shí)仍然并非如此。

　　Second, for 20 to 30 years after the Nifty Fifty peaked, the basket of stocks, as a whole, underperformed the market.

　　其次，Nifty Fifty火爆之后的20-30年間，股票籃子整體市場(chǎng)表現(xiàn)不佳。

　　However, by the time you started getting into the 30 to 40-year range, the underlying businesses were, in fact, so good that they ultimately ended up beating the market as the core economic engines were so superior they burned off the excess valuation.

　　然而你買了30-40年之后，這個(gè)潛在的投資產(chǎn)品其實(shí)也很好，最終能戰(zhàn)勝股市，因?yàn)楹诵慕?jīng)濟(jì)引擎太好了，能消耗掉過剩價(jià)值。

　　Not only that, but the Nifty Fifty would have had better tax efficiency than an index fund. When dealing with excellent businesses, the ghost ship approach, historically, has won in the long-run but how many investors are willing to stick with 30 or 40 years of near total passivity in a lifetime that, for most people, will last only 80 years or so? Again, it's an issue for behavioral economics.

　　不僅如此，Nifty Fifty比指數(shù)基金的稅收效益更好，從歷史角度來看“幽靈船”的方法針對(duì)好的投資產(chǎn)品具有長(zhǎng)期優(yōu)勢(shì)，但有多少投資者愿意一輩子幾乎完全被動(dòng)地等上30或40年呢?大多數(shù)人只能活80歲左右。再?gòu)?qiáng)調(diào)一下，這是行為經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)的問題。

　　All else equal, though, try and avoid investments that are priced to perfection with no margin of safety because a mere blip in operating performance could cause a long-term, catastrophic loss in principal as fickle speculators flee to hotter securities.

　　然而其他的都一樣，你要盡量避免定價(jià)完美但利潤(rùn)沒有保證的投資，因?yàn)椴僮鲿r(shí)的一點(diǎn)波動(dòng)，都會(huì)對(duì)本金造成長(zhǎng)期的巨大損失，因?yàn)樽兓療o常的投機(jī)者會(huì)轉(zhuǎn)向更熱門的證券市場(chǎng)。

　　Even then, if you are going to consider it, stick solely to the bluest of the blue chips. You can probably get away with overpaying for a company like Johnson & Johnson if you're going to hold it for the next 50 years - nobody knows the future but the odds seem to favor it - whereas I wouldn't be so keen on doing it for a firm like Facebook.

　　盡管如此，如果你想，你還可以堅(jiān)持只投藍(lán)籌股中最穩(wěn)定的，強(qiáng)生這種公司的股票如果你在手里存50年也能避免花冤枉錢，誰也不能預(yù)測(cè)未來，但勝算還是有的，否則我也不會(huì)熱衷于長(zhǎng)期持有臉書這樣的公司的股票。