The rest is history. In just 3p years, China went from one of the poorest agricultural countries in the world to its second-largest economy. Six hundred fifty million people were lifted out of poverty.

　　實(shí)際上，這期間全世界80%的減貧任務(wù)是由中國完成的。也就是說，如果沒有中國的成績(jī)，全世界的減貧成就不值一提。換句話說，所有老的、新的民主國家的脫貧人口加起來，都不及中國一個(gè)零頭。而取得這些成績(jī)的中國，沒有實(shí)行他們所謂的選舉，也沒有實(shí)行多黨制。

　　Eighty percent of the entire world’s poverty alleviation during that period happened in China. In other words, all the new and old democracies put together amounted to a mere fraction of what a single, one-party state did without voting.

　　看，這是我小時(shí)候的生活必需品：糧票，上海一時(shí)每人每月肉類定額是300克。不用說，我把外婆的份額全給吃了。所以，我禁不住問自己，我眼前畫面到底哪里不對(duì)勁兒?我的故鄉(xiāng)上海，一切都已今非昔比，我自己的事業(yè)也蒸蒸日上，新生企業(yè)如雨后春筍般發(fā)展起來，中產(chǎn)階級(jí)以史無前例的速度和規(guī)模在增長(zhǎng)。但根據(jù)那個(gè)宏大敘事，這一切繁榮景象本都不可能出現(xiàn)。

　　See, I grew up on this stuff: food stamps. Meat was rationed to a few hundred grams per person per month at one point. Needless to say, I ate my grandmother’s portions. So I asked myself, what’s wrong with this picture? Here I am in my hometown, my business growing leaps and bounds. Entrepreneurs are starting companies every day. Middle class is expanding in speed and scale unprecedented in human history. Yet, according to the grand story, none of this should be happening.

　　面對(duì)這一切，我開始做我唯一可以做的事，即研究它!中國的確是個(gè)一黨制的國家，由中國共產(chǎn)黨長(zhǎng)期執(zhí)政，不實(shí)行西方意義上的選舉。按照當(dāng)代主流的政治理論，人們據(jù)此可以生成三個(gè)判斷，即這個(gè)體制在體制上一定是僵化的、政治上是封閉的、道德上不具合法性的。

　　So I went and did the only thing I could. I studied it. Yes, China is a one-party state run by the Chinese Communist Party, the Party, and they don’t hold elections. There assumptions are made by the dominant political theories of our time. Such a system is operationally rigid(勃列日涅夫的蘇聯(lián)), politically closed(金氏家族的朝鮮), and morally illegitimate(伊朗).

　　但這些論斷被證明是完全錯(cuò)誤的。事實(shí)恰恰相反，中國的一黨制具有與時(shí)俱進(jìn)的能力、選賢任能的體制、深植于民心的政權(quán)合法性，這些是確保其成功的核心要素。

　　Well, the assumptions are wrong. The opposites are true. Adaptability, meritocracy, and legitimacy are the three defining characteristics of China’s one-party system.

　　大多數(shù)政治學(xué)家斷言，一黨制天生缺乏自我糾錯(cuò)能力，因此很難持久。

　　但歷史實(shí)踐卻證明這一斷言過于自信。中共已經(jīng)在中國這個(gè)世界上最大的國家之一連續(xù)執(zhí)政64年，其政策調(diào)整的幅度超過近代任何國家。從激進(jìn)的土改到“大躍進(jìn)”運(yùn)動(dòng)，再到土地“準(zhǔn)私有化”;從““””到鄧小平的市場(chǎng)化改革。鄧小平的繼任者江澤民更進(jìn)一步，主動(dòng)吸納包括民營(yíng)企業(yè)家在內(nèi)的新社會(huì)階層人士入黨，而這在毛的時(shí)代是不可想象的。事實(shí)證明，中共具有超凡的與時(shí)俱進(jìn)和自我糾錯(cuò)能力。

　　Now, most political scientists will tell us that a one-party system is inherently incapable of self-correction. It won’t last long because it cannot adapt. Now here are the facts. In 64 years of running the largest country in the world, the range of the party’s policies has been wider than any other country in recent memory, from radical land collectivization(激進(jìn)的土改) to the Great Leap Forward(大躍進(jìn)), then privatization of farmland(土地私有化), then the Cultural Revolution(“”), then Deng Xiaoping’s market reform(市場(chǎng)改革), then successor Jiang Zemin took the giant political step of opening up party membership to private businesspeople, something unimaginable during Mao’s rule. So the party self-corrects in rather dramatic fashions.

　　過去實(shí)行的一些不再有效的制度也不斷得到糾正和更新。比如，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的任期制，毛時(shí)期，政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人實(shí)際上是終身任職的。這容易導(dǎo)致大權(quán)獨(dú)攬、不受制約等問題。毛澤東作為現(xiàn)代中國的締造者，在位晚年也未能避免犯下類似的嚴(yán)重錯(cuò)誤。隨后，中共逐步實(shí)施了領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的任期制，并將任職的年齡上限確定為68到70歲。

　　Institutionally, new rules get enacted to correct previous dysfunctions. For example, term limits. Political leaders used to retain their positions for life, and they used that to accumulate power and perpetuate their rules. Mao was the father of modern China, yet his prolonged rule led to disastrous mistakes. So the party instituted term limits with mandatory retirement age of 68 to 70.

　　最近很多人聲稱，相比于經(jīng)濟(jì)改革，中國的政治改革嚴(yán)重滯后，因此當(dāng)前亟需在政改中取得突破。這一論斷實(shí)際上是隱藏著政治偏見的話語陷阱，這個(gè)話語陷阱預(yù)設(shè)了哪些變革才算所謂的政治改革，只有實(shí)行這些特定的變革才行。事實(shí)上，中國的政治改革從未停滯。與三十年、二十年，甚至十年前相比，中國從基層到高層，從社會(huì)各領(lǐng)域到國家治理方式上，都發(fā)生了翻天覆地的變化。如果沒有根本性的政治改革，這一切變化都是不可能的。

　　One thing we often hear is political reforms have lagged far behind economic reforms and China is in dire need of political reform. But this claim is a rhetorical trap hidden behind a political bias. See, some have decided a priori what kinds of changes they want to see, and only such changes can be called political reform. The truth is, political reforms have never stopped. Compared with 30 years ago, 20 years, even 10 years ago, every aspect of Chinese society, how the country is governed, from the most local level to the highest center, are unrecognizable today. Now such changes are simply not possible without political reforms of the most fundamental kind.

　　我甚至想大膽地判斷說，中共是世界第一流的政治改革專家。西方主流的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為，一黨制意味著政治上封閉，一小撮人把持了權(quán)力，必然導(dǎo)致劣政和腐敗。的確，腐敗是一個(gè)大問題。不過，讓我們先打開視野看一下全景。說起來可能令人難以置信，中共內(nèi)部選賢任能競(jìng)爭(zhēng)之激烈程度，可能超過世界上所有的政治組織。

　　Now I would venture to suggest the Party is the world’s leading expert in political reform. The second assumption is that in a one-party state, power gets concentrated in the hands of the few, and bad governance and corruption(劣政和腐敗) follow.Indeed, corruption is a big problem。but let’s first look at the larger context. Now, this maybe be counterintuitive to you. The party happens to be one of the most meritocratic political institutions in the world today.

　　前，中共的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)機(jī)構(gòu)——中央政治局共有25名委員，其中只有5人出身背景優(yōu)越，也就是所謂的“太子黨”。其余20人，包括國家主席胡錦濤和政府溫家寶，都是平民出身。再看300多人組成的十七屆中央委員會(huì)，出身顯赫者的比例更低。可以說，絕大多數(shù)中共高層領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人都是靠自身努力和激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)獲得晉升的。與其他發(fā)達(dá)國家和發(fā)展中國家統(tǒng)治精英的出身相比，我們必須承認(rèn)中共內(nèi)部平民出身的干部享有廣闊的晉升空間。

　　China’s highest ruling body, the Politburo, has 25 members. In the most recent one, only five of them came from a background of privilege, so-called Princelings.(太子黨) The other 20, including the President and the Premier, came from entirely ordinary backgrounds. In the larger central committee of 300 or more, the percentage of those who were born into power and wealth was even smaller. The vast majority(絕大多數(shù)) of senior Chinese leaders worked and competed their way to the top. Compare that with the ruling elites in both developed and developing countries, I think you’ll find the Party being near the top in upward mobility.

　　問題是，中共如何在一黨制的基礎(chǔ)上保證選賢任能呢?關(guān)鍵之一是有一個(gè)強(qiáng)有力的組織機(jī)構(gòu)，即組織部。對(duì)此西方鮮有人知。這套機(jī)制選賢任能的效力，恐怕最成功的商業(yè)公司都會(huì)自嘆弗如。

　　The question then is, how could that be possible in a system run by one party? New we come to a powerful political institution, little- known to Westerners: the Party’s Organization Department.(組織部) The Department functions like a giant human resource engine that would be the envy of even some of the most successful corporations.

　　它像一個(gè)旋轉(zhuǎn)的金字塔，有三個(gè)部位組合而成。中國的公務(wù)人員分為三類：即政府職能部門、國有企業(yè)，以及政府管轄的事業(yè)單位，如大學(xué)、社區(qū)組織等。公務(wù)人員既可以在某一類部門中長(zhǎng)期工作，也可以在三類中交替任職。政府以及相關(guān)機(jī)構(gòu)一年一度地從大學(xué)畢業(yè)生中招錄人員，大部分新人會(huì)從最低一級(jí)的科員干起。組織部門會(huì)根據(jù)其表現(xiàn)，決定是否將其提升到更高的管理職位上，比如副科、科、副處、處。這可不是電影《龍威小子》中的動(dòng)作名稱，而是嚴(yán)肅的人事工作。

　　It operates a rotation pyramid made up of three components: civil service(政府職能部門), state-owned enterprises(國有企業(yè)), and social organizations (政府管轄的事業(yè)單位)like a university or a community program. The form separate yet integrated career paths for Chinese officials. They recruit college grads into entry-level positions in all three tracks, and they start from the bottom, called Keyuan Then they could get promoted through four increasingly elite ranks: fuke, ke, fuchu, and chu. Now these are not moves from karate kids, okay? It’s serious business.

　　這一區(qū)間的職位包羅萬象，既可以負(fù)責(zé)貧困農(nóng)村的衛(wèi)生工作，也可能負(fù)責(zé)城區(qū)里的招商引資，也可能是一家公司的基層經(jīng)理。各級(jí)干部每年都要接受組織部門的考察，其中包括征求上級(jí)、下級(jí)和同事的反饋意見，以及個(gè)人操守審查，此外還有民意調(diào)查，最終擇優(yōu)提職。

　　The range of positions is wide, from running health care in a village to foreign investment in a city district to manager in a company.。Once a year, the department reviews their performance. They interview their superiors, their peers their subordinates. They vet their personal conduct. They conduct public opinion surveys. Then they promote the winners.

　　在整個(gè)職業(yè)生涯中，中共的干部可以在政府職能部門、企業(yè)，以及社會(huì)事業(yè)單位等三大領(lǐng)域內(nèi)輪轉(zhuǎn)任職。在基層表現(xiàn)優(yōu)秀的佼佼者可以晉升為副局和正局級(jí)干部，進(jìn)入高級(jí)干部行列。這一級(jí)別的干部，有可能領(lǐng)導(dǎo)數(shù)百萬人口的城區(qū)，也有可能管理年?duì)I業(yè)收入數(shù)億美元的企業(yè)。從統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)據(jù)就可以看出選拔局級(jí)干部的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)有多激烈，2012年，中國科級(jí)與副科級(jí)干部約為90萬人，處級(jí)與副處級(jí)干部約為60萬人，而局級(jí)與副局級(jí)干部?jī)H為4萬人。在局級(jí)干部中，只有最為出眾的極少數(shù)人才有機(jī)會(huì)繼續(xù)晉升，最終進(jìn)入中共中央委員會(huì)。

　　Throughout their careers, these cadres can move through and out of all three tracks. Over time, the food ones move beyond the four base levels to the fuju and ju, levels. There, they enter high, officialdom. By that point, a typical assignment will be to manage a district with population in the millions or a company with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue. Just to show you how competitive the system is, in 2012, there were 900000 fuke and ke levels, 600000 fuchu and chu levels, and only 40000 fuju and ju levels. After the ju levels, the best few move further up several more ranks, and eventually make it to the Central Committee.

　　就職業(yè)生涯來看，一位干部要晉升到高層，期間一般要經(jīng)過二三十年的工作歷練。這過程中有任人唯親的問題嗎，當(dāng)然有。但從根本上，干部是否德才兼?zhèn)洳攀翘岚蔚臎Q定性因素。事實(shí)上，中華帝國的官僚體系有著千年歷史，今天中共的組織部門創(chuàng)造性地繼承了這一獨(dú)特的歷史遺產(chǎn)，并發(fā)展成現(xiàn)代化的制度以培養(yǎng)當(dāng)代中國的政治精英。

　　The process takes two to three decades. Does patronage play a role? Yes of course. But merit remains the fundamental driver. In essence, the Organization Department runs a modernizes version of China’s centuries-old mandarin system.

　　的履歷就是非常鮮明的例證。習(xí)的父親確實(shí)是中共的一位前領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，但他的仕途也歷經(jīng)了30年之久。從村干部做起，一步一個(gè)腳印的走到今天這個(gè)崗位。在他進(jìn)入中央政治局之前，他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)過的地區(qū)總?cè)丝诶塾?jì)已超過1.5億，創(chuàng)造的GDP合計(jì)超過1.5萬億美元。千萬不要誤解，這不是針對(duì)具體的人，僅僅是事實(shí)的陳述。如果要論政府管理經(jīng)驗(yàn)，小布什在任前是德州州長(zhǎng)和奧巴馬第一次問鼎美國總統(tǒng)時(shí)，他們資歷還比不上中國一個(gè)小縣長(zhǎng)。溫斯頓·丘吉爾曾說：“民主是個(gè)壞制度，但其他制度更壞”。

　　China’s new President Xi Jinping is son of a former leader, which is very unusual, first of his kind to make the top job. Even for him, the career took 30 years. He started as a village manager, and by the time he entered the Politburo, he had managed areas with total population of 150 million people and combined GDPs of 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars. Now, please don’t get me wrong, okay? This is not a putdown of anyone. It’s just a statement of fact. George W. Bush, remember him? This is not a putdown. Before becoming Governor of Texas, or Barack Obama before running for President, could not make even a small county manager in China’s system. Winston Churchill once said that democracy is a terrible system except for all the rest.

　　可惜，他沒有見識(shí)過組織部。西方人總認(rèn)為多黨競(jìng)選和普選是合法性的唯一來源。曾有人問我：“中共不經(jīng)選舉執(zhí)政，其合法性從何而來?”我的回答是：“舍我其誰的執(zhí)政能力。”我們都知道歷史，1949年中共執(zhí)政時(shí)，由于戰(zhàn)火肆虐，外敵橫行，中國的國土四分五裂，滿目瘡痍;中國人的人均壽命僅為41歲。但在今天，中國已躋身世界第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，成為在全球有重要影響的大國，人民生活迅速改善，人均壽命排名奇跡般地列中等發(fā)達(dá)國家前茅。

　　Well, apparently he hadn’t heard of the Organization Department. Now, Westerners always assume that multi-party election with universal suffrage is the only source of political legitimacy. I was asked once, “The Party wasn’t voted in by election. Where is the source of Legitimacy?” I said, “How about competency?”: We all know the facts. In 1949, when the Party took power, China was mired in civil wars, dismembered by foreign aggression, average life expectancy at that time, 41 years old. Today, it’s the second largest economy in the world, an industrial powerhouse, and its people live in increasing prosperity.

　　根據(jù)皮尤研究中心在中國的民意調(diào)查報(bào)告，其中一些數(shù)據(jù)反映了中國的主流民意，其中大部分?jǐn)?shù)據(jù)在近幾十年來十分穩(wěn)定。高達(dá)85%的中國民眾，對(duì)國家未來方向表示滿意;70%的民眾認(rèn)為在過去的五年生活得到改善;82%的民眾對(duì)未來五年頗感樂觀。英國《金融時(shí)報(bào)》剛剛公布的全球青年人民調(diào)結(jié)果顯示：93%的中國90后年輕人對(duì)國家的未來感到樂觀。

　　Pew Research polls Chinese public attitudes, and here are the numbers in recent years. Satisfaction with the direction of the country: 85 percent. Those who think they’re better off than five years ago, 70%. Those who expects the future to be better, a whopping 82 percent. Financial Times polls global youth attitudes and these numbers, brand new, just came from last week. Ninety-three-percent of China’s GenerationY are optimistic about their country’s future.

　　如果這不是合法性，那我就不知道到底什么才是合法性了。相比之下，全世界大部分選舉民主制國家都處于慘淡經(jīng)營(yíng)的境況。關(guān)于美國和歐洲的政治困境，在座的聽眾都了然于胸，無需我再詳述。除了極少數(shù)例外，大部分采用選舉的發(fā)展中國家，迄今為止還在遭受貧困和戰(zhàn)火的折磨。政府通過選舉上臺(tái)后，其支持率在幾個(gè)月內(nèi)就會(huì)跌到50%以下，從此一蹶不振甚至持續(xù)走低，直到下一次選舉。可以說，民主已經(jīng)陷入“一次選舉，長(zhǎng)期后悔”的周期性怪圈。這樣下去，失去合法性的恐怕不是中國的一黨制，而是選舉民主制。